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The Newfoundland Railway, Freight Rates, and the 
Terms of Union between Newfoundland and Canada
Peter Neary
The history of the origins of the Terms of Union between Newfound-
land and Canada — a constitutional document — has been studied 
extensively, and there is a growing body of scholarship about the spe-
cific terms that have been fought over since union took effect in 1949. 
In 1959, Term 29, which promised a review and adjustment of New-
foundland’s financial position within Confederation, ignited a battle 
royal between St. John’s and Ottawa, an episode well documented in 
Raymond B. Blake’s 2015 study, Lions or Jellyfish: Newfoundland–Ottawa 
Relations since 1957. In 1984, in a decision that triggered the events 
leading to the 1985 Atlantic Accord, the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled that jurisdiction over the resources under the seabed off New-
foundland belonged to Canada. Not surprisingly, Ottawa’s jurisdiction 
over fisheries matters has been a continuing source of friction with an 
ocean province. In the 1990s, Term 17, which dealt with education 
rights, was back in the news, when the province moved against its 
publicly funded denominational system of education; to achieve its 
purpose, using a procedure specified in the Constitution Act, 1982, 
Newfoundland secured two amendments to Term 17, the first in 1997 
and the second in 1998. In 2001, in another action made possible by 
the same Act, the name of the province was changed from “Province 
of Newfoundland” to “Province of Newfoundland and Labrador.” In 
2011, understanding of how Newfoundland was fitted into the Canada 
of the 1940s was advanced by the publication of Corey Slumkoski’s 
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Inventing Atlantic Canada: Regionalism and the Maritime Reaction to 
Newfoundland’s Entry into Canadian Confederation; and in a compre-
hensive 2012 article in this journal about the “Roads-for-Rails” (1988) 
and “Roads-for-Boats” (1997) federal–provincial agreements, Jeffrey 
F. Collins broke new research ground regarding the arrangement made 
under Term 31 whereby Canada took over “the Newfoundland Rail-
way, including steamship and other marine services.”1 
The purpose of the present paper is to look in detail at the making 
of the related Term 32 and the long and complex history of litigation 
regarding it that began in the early 1950s and continued into the 
twenty-first century. This litigation mainly concerned railway freight 
rates through changing transportation circumstances, but the recent 
focus of contention — in Oceanex Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Transport) 
— has been the application of national transportation policy to freight 
rates on the constitutionally guaranteed ferry service between Port aux 
Basques, Newfoundland and Labrador, and North Sydney, Nova Scotia. 
By definition, Terms 31 and 32 loom large in the history of federal–
provincial relations vis-à-vis Canada’s tenth province.
•  •  •
In mid-1946 the people of Newfoundland and Labrador, who had 
been living since 16 February 1934 under a British-appointed Com-
mission of Government, elected members to a National Convention.2 
As specified in the governing legislation, their task was:
to consider and discuss among themselves as elected rep-
resentatives of the people of Newfoundland the changes 
that have taken place in the commercial and economic sit-
uation of the Island since 1934, and bearing in mind the 
extent to which the high revenues of recent years have 
been due to wartime conditions to examine the position of 
the country and to make recommendations to His Maj-
esty’s Government in the United Kingdom as to possible 
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forms of future government to be put before the people at 
a national referendum.3
The convention, therefore, was an advisory rather than a legislative 
body, with the United Kingdom reserving to itself the last word on the 
substance of the forthcoming referendum. 
At the time, the Newfoundland Railway was one of the country’s 
biggest enterprises and major employers, and, not surprisingly, its af-
fairs loomed large in the proceedings of the National Convention, 
which began meeting in the Colonial Building in St. John’s on 11 Sep-
tember 1946. Launched in the late nineteenth century as a private en-
terprise, though with healthy government support, the railway, which 
was of narrow rather than standard gauge, had been publicly owned 
since 1923. In 1947, it had a main line of 547.22 miles running from 
St. John’s to Port aux Basques, five branch lines, total track of 705.13 
miles, and 3,700 employees.4 In addition to its land operations, it ran a 
coastal boat service and a ferry service, dating from 1898, that linked 
Port aux Basques and North Sydney across the Cabot Strait, Gulf of 
St. Lawrence. For a time the Gulf ferry service had attracted Canadian 
subsidy, but this had disappeared when the railway had been taken over 
by the Newfoundland government.5 Subsequently, Newfoundland had 
attempted to extract further Canadian subsidy by tying the matter to 
trade negotiations, but nothing had come of this and by the 1940s the 
issue was lost in the fog of time. For most of its history under public 
ownership the railway system had lost money but, thanks to wartime 
prosperity, it turned profits in 1940–44.6 In 1945–46 its operating rev-
enue was $11,140,417 and its operating expenses $12,456,616.
To get on with its work leading to the recommendation to Lon-
don of possible constitutional options, the National Convention 
formed 13 committees. One of them was devoted to transportation 
and communications and was chaired by Joseph Roberts Smallwood, 
the member for Bonavista Centre. A radical with a checkered past, he 
became the leading advocate in the National Convention for Con-
federation with Canada. The committee he chaired investigated “six 
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activities of the government,” one of them being the Newfoundland 
railway system.7 The Convention likewise voted to send exploratory 
delegations first to London and then to Ottawa. The London delega-
tion received a decidedly cool reception: facing post-war adversity 
and retreat from empire, the British were anxious to dismantle the 
Commission of Government and favoured the union of Newfound-
land with Canada, an objective they had been pushing for behind the 
scenes. By contrast, the delegation to Ottawa was warmly received. 
Its task was to ascertain what “fair and equitable basis” might exist for 
the federal union of the two countries.8
The Ottawa delegation was chaired by F. Gordon Bradley, the sit-
ting chair of the National Convention, and had as its other members 
Smallwood, T.G.W. Ashbourne (Twillingate), Charles Ballam (Hum-
ber), Lester Burry (Labrador), P. Wellington Crummey (Bay de Verde), 
and Gordon F. Higgins (St. John’s City [East]).It was welcomed to the 
Canadian capital by Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King at 
a ceremony held in the Railway Committee Room of the House of 
Commons on the morning of 25 June 1947.9 Substantive talks be-
tween the two sides began that afternoon, when Canadian Secretary 
of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent was chosen to chair 
proceedings, and it was agreed that no verbatim transcript of discus-
sions would be kept.10 On this occasion also the Newfoundland dele-
gation submitted a memorandum detailing Newfoundland services 
that, in the event of union, “would appear to fall in the federal sphere.” 
In the fall of 1945, anticipating the negotiations that had now 
come to pass, Canada had appointed a cabinet committee on New-
foundland, which was advised by an interdepartmental committee on 
Canadian–Newfoundland relations.11 The interdepartmental commit-
tee, chaired by R.A. MacKay, had begun meeting in May 1946.12 
During the war MacKay had left his position as Eric Dennis Memo-
rial Professor of Government and Political Science at Dalhousie Uni-
versity for the post of special assistant in the Department of External 
Affairs. He was arguably Ottawa’s leading expert on Newfoundland 
affairs and in 1946 edited Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic, and 
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Strategic Studies, published by Oxford University Press under the aus-
pices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. He was at the fore 
in facilitating the 1947 negotiations, and his papers, now part of the 
collections of Library and Archives Canada, are a rich source for un-
derstanding both what happened in the talks with the Newfoundland 
delegation and subsequent events.13
At a plenary session of the two delegations held on 7 July, it 
was decided that the conversations “had reached a point where sub- 
committees might profitably be set up to explore more fully and more 
expeditiously than would be practicable in general meetings a number 
of subjects which would require to be dealt with in detail as a prelimi-
nary to considering the question of a basis of union.”14 One of the 
subcommittees created was devoted to transportation and had as its 
Canadian members Transport Minister Lionel Chevrier, Deputy Min-
ister of Transport C.P. Edwards, S.W. Fairweather of Canadian Na-
tional Railways (CNR/CN), and H.J. Rahlves of the Park Steamship 
Company, a federal Crown corporation. The Newfoundland members 
were Ballam, Higgins, and Smallwood. The task of the subcommittee 
was “to bring together information on the Newfoundland Railway and 
Steamship Services with a view to enabling the Canadian representa-
tives to examine the problems that would be involved, in the event of 
union, in the integration of the Newfoundland Government Railway 
and Steamship Services with the Canadian transportation system.”15 
Another subcommittee addressed the matter of Maritime freight rates, 
which had preferred status in Canada under the terms of the Maritime 
Freight Rates Act, 1927. Its members were Edwards and Fairweather 
for Canada and Ballam, Crummey, and Smallwood for Newfoundland; 
its job was “to examine information on the reduced freight rates ac-
corded to goods moving within or out of the Maritime region of Can-
ada and the applicability, in the event of union with Canada, of such 
reduced rates to products moving within or out of Newfoundland.”16
The information gathered by the investigative subcommittees was 
co-ordinated by another subcommittee, which had as its Canadian 
members Finance Minister J.L. Ilsley and National Revenue Minister 
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J.J. McCann, assisted by MacKay, Mitchell Sharp (Department of 
Finance), and other officials as required. Their Newfoundland counter-
parts on this drafting committee were Ashbourne, Higgins, and 
Smallwood. After this working group had examined “the various re-
ports submitted” and discussed “the means whereby the principal issues 
involved in union might be met,” the Canadian members undertook 
“to report promptly to the Cabinet Committee regarding a basis for 
union which might be fair and equitable to both Newfoundland and 
Canada.”17 On the agenda of the drafting committee for its meeting of 
29 August the question was raised “Whether anything is to be included 
covering steamship connections between Port Aux Basques and North 
Sydney.”18 According to a notation on MacKay’s copy of this document, 
the matter was referred for advice to J.R. Baldwin, assistant secretary 
to the cabinet. 
In the event, the first draft of the document entitled “Basis for the 
admission of Newfoundland as a Province of Canada,” dated 23 Sep-
tember 1947, provided, inter alia, as follows:
12. TRANSPORTATION
The Government of Canada, either directly or through an 
appropriate Government agency, will maintain steamship 
services between North Sydney and Port aux Basques in 
accordance with the traffic offering, and on completion of 
a motor highway between Corner Brook and Port aux 
Basques will make provision for a suitable service for the 
carriage of motor vehicles between North Sydney and Port 
aux Basques.
13. Railway services and railway rates over the Newfound-
land Railway will be subject to regulation by the Board of 
Transport Commissioners of Canada similarly to railway 
services and rates elsewhere in Canada. For the purpose of 
rate regulation through traffic moving between North 
Sydney and Port aux Basques shall be treated as all-rail 
traffic. The province of Newfoundland shall also be 
deemed to be within the Maritime region of Canada, and 
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any legislation of the Parliament of Canada, such as the 
Maritime Freight Rates Act, 1927, and amendments, pro-
viding for special rates on freight within, into or out of the 
Maritime region shall, so far as appropriate, be deemed to 
apply to Newfoundland.19
A suggested alternative wording to item 12, deemed to be preferable 
in the draft, read:
An efficient steamship service for the conveyance of mails, 
passengers and freight shall be maintained between the 
Island and the Mainland by the Government of Canada.
As will be seen, however, this wording was ultimately passed over.
With Bradley under mounting pressure to return to St. John’s and 
call the National Convention back into session (it had adjourned on 
26 May), the Newfoundland delegates were anxious to leave Ottawa 
with a Canadian offer of terms of union in hand. But this objective was 
put beyond reach on 10 August when Frank Bridges, Canada’s Minis-
ter of Fisheries and New Brunswick’s representative in the cabinet, 
died suddenly. On 2 September Milton F. Gregg, another New Bruns-
wicker, was sworn in as Minister of Fisheries, but Prime Minister King 
was unwilling to proceed with an offer to Newfoundland pending a 
by-election in Bridges’s seat of York-Sunbury, which Gregg would 
now contest on behalf of the governing Liberal Party. King believed 
that New Brunswick “was dead against Newfoundland coming in on 
practically any terms” and that the Progressive Conservative candidate 
in York-Sunbury would be helped “if anything were said which indi-
cated we were keen on having Newfoundland brought in.”20 In the 
circumstances, King was against giving “any assurance” to the New-
foundland delegates that the Canadian government’s decision “would 
be made known at a specific date.” The “most” that King was willing to 
proffer was that Canada’s decision “would be given as expeditiously as 
circumstances would permit,” after due consideration by cabinet. So 
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worried was the prime minister about upsetting established provinces 
by a false move in relation to Newfoundland that he hesitated to act 
until every province was represented in his cabinet by an elected mem-
ber of Parliament.
Thus, instead of returning home with draft terms of union, the New-
foundland delegation brought back a summary of proceedings in Ottawa, 
which was agreed to on 29 September at the final meeting between the 
two parties.21 The two-part summary, with 15 appendices and an annex, 
was entitled Meeting[s] between delegates for the National Convention of 
Newfoundland and representatives of the Government of Canada[:] Ottawa, 
June 25th–September 29th, 1947, Part I (Summary of Proceedings — Open-
ing Statements[;] Documents Exchanged at Opening of Discussions), Part II 
(Answers to Questions — Submissions of Sub-Committees [—] List of Docu-
ments). On 11 October, when the National Convention resumed sitting, 
it was introduced at a stormy session that triggered Bradley’s resignation 
as chairman (he was succeeded on 15 October by St. John’s lawyer John 
Bernard McEvoy).22 Because of its black covers, the bulky two-part 
report was dubbed in the Convention the Black Books (or Black Book). 
Appendix VII gave a “preliminary statement of what would be involved 
in the integration of the Newfoundland government’s railway and steam-
ship services with the Canadian Railway System.” Dated July 1947, this 
was comprehensive in scope, and summarized thinking at the time on a 
major item of negotiation.
•  •  •
While the National Convention was digesting the Black Books, work 
proceeded in Ottawa on draft terms of union, with the way for approval 
cleared by Gregg’s by-election win in York-Sunbury on 20 October. 
On 28 October, the Canadian cabinet approved the terms of an offer 
and this document was then sent to Governor Gordon Macdonald of 
Newfoundland for the attention of the National Convention. In his 
covering letter King set this limit on future negotiations:
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I feel I must emphasize that as far as the financial aspects 
of the proposed arrangements for union are concerned, the 
Government of Canada believes that the arrangements go 
as far as the Government can go under the circumstances. 
The Government could not readily contemplate any 
change in these arrangements which would impose larger 
financial burdens on Canada. On the other hand, with re-
spect to those matters which are primarily of provincial 
concern, such as education, the Government of Canada 
would not wish to set down any rigid conditions, and it 
would be prepared to give reasonable consideration to sug-
gestions for modifications or addition.23
Proposed arrangements for the Newfoundland Railway were de-
tailed in two sections of Ottawa’s offer. Clause 5 had this preamble: “At 
the union, or as soon as practicable thereafter, the following services 
will be taken over by Canada and become subject to the jurisdiction of 
Parliament, Newfoundland to be relieved of the public costs incurred 
in respect of each service after it is taken over.” A 13-part list followed, 
with the first item being “The Newfoundland Railway, including 
steamship and other marine services.” Clause 8 in turn listed 10 “pub-
lic works and property” that would become the property of Canada 
when the service concerned was taken over pursuant to clause 5. At 
the head of this list was “The Newfoundland Railway, including rights 
of way, wharves, drydocks and other real property, rolling stock, equip-
ment, ships and other personal property, Canada to assume the cost of 
the two steamships contracted for on behalf of the Railway and pres-
ently under construction in the United Kingdom.” Under clause 16 
the following related arrangements were proposed:
(1) Canada will maintain in accordance with the traffic of-
fering a steamship service between North Sydney and Port 
aux Basques, which, on completion of a motor highway 
between Corner Brook and Port aux Basques, will include 
suitable provision for the carriage of motor vehicles.
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(2) Railway services and railway rates over the Newfound-
land Railway will be subject to regulation by the Board of 
Transport Commissioners of Canada as are railway services 
and rates elsewhere in Canada.
(3) For the purpose of rate regulation:
(a) Through-traffic moving between North Sydney 
and Port aux Basques will be treated as all-rail traffic;
(b) The Island of Newfoundland will be deemed to be 
within the Maritime region of Canada and any legisla-
tion of the Parliament of Canada (such as the Maritime 
Freight Rates Act, 1927, and amendments) providing 
for special rates on freight traffic moving within, into or 
out of, the Maritime region will, so far as appropriate, be 
made applicable to Newfoundland.
Clauses 5, 8, and 16 all had ample Canadian precedent and could read-
ily be justified to existing provinces. The Canadian government owned 
a railway system; a ferry service had been promised to Prince Edward 
Island in its 1873 terms of union; the Board of Transport Commis-
sioners had jurisdiction over the entire country; and the Maritime 
Freight Rates Act, 1927 — the product of the Maritime Rights move-
ment of the 1920s — helped grease the wheels of Canadian federal-
ism. Ottawa’s bargaining with Newfoundland, moreover, took place 
against the background of rising tension within the Dominion about 
freight rates, a topic that was never far from a rolling boil in a continent- 
wide federation of diverse regions. After the war, a spike in freight 
rates had triggered a protest movement, led by Nova Scotia and Man-
itoba, which mobilized the support of all provinces except Ontario and 
Quebec.24 In its dealings with Newfoundland, Ottawa had good rea-
son to proceed cautiously, which it did. 
•  •  •
On 6 November the Canadian offer reached the National Convention, 
where, thanks to its cover, it became known as the Grey Book, and a 
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spirited debate about it began two weeks later.25 Smallwood, who had 
emerged as the leading advocate of union with Canada, was at the fore 
in pushing the proposal but failed to achieve necessary support. On 23 
January 1948, as the Convention was finishing up its business, he in-
troduced a resolution whereby Confederation with Canada would be 
one of the choices recommended to the British for inclusion on the 
referendum ballot, but on 29 January his resolution was defeated by a 
vote of 29–16. In the end, the advice of the National Convention to 
London was that in the planned referendum the voters be offered a 
choice between “Responsible Government as it existed prior to 1934” 
and “Commission of Government.”26 The United Kingdom govern-
ment, however, had the final say, and on 11 March 1948 it announced 
that the ballot would feature three choices — revised versions of the 
two options recommended by the National Convention and Confed-
eration with Canada. On the ballot paper, the choices to be decided 
upon were given as “COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT for a 
period of five years,” “CONFEDERATION WITH CANADA,” and 
“RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT as it existed in 1933.”27
The British now also ruled that the choice to be followed would 
have to have majority support among those who voted. Because there 
were three choices, this requirement might not be met on the first 
ballot. If this happened, the option with the lowest number of votes 
would be dropped and a second referendum held to decide between 
the other two constitutional choices. In practice, a second vote was 
indeed required; in the first referendum, held on 3 June, the Responsi-
ble Government option received the largest number of votes, with 
Confederation coming second, and Commission of Government a 
poor third. The runoff vote was then held on 22 July 1948; this time 
Confederation bested Responsible Government by 78,323 to 71,334.
•  •  •
After Canada had made known its willingness to proceed on the basis 
of this result, the Commission of Government appointed a delegation 
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to go to Ottawa to negotiate final terms of union. The delegation was 
chaired by Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education Albert J. 
Walsh, a Newfoundlander,28 and had six other members, including 
Bradley and Smallwood, the leader on the hustings in the rough-and-
tumble fight for Confederation. In preparation for its work in Ottawa, 
the delegation held a series of meetings in St. John’s, beginning on 25 
August.29 On 31 August it heard from H.J. Russell, the manager of the 
Newfoundland Railway, about the impact that Canadian freight rates 
would have on transportation services in Newfoundland:
Mr. Russell stated that the treatment of freight moving 
from North Sydney to Port-aux-Basques as all-rail traffic, 
together with the application of current Canadian freight 
rates, will cut the present Newfoundland rates in half and 
will be of considerable benefit to Newfoundland generally. 
Unfortunately North Sydney cannot handle all of our im-
ports from Canada, and as a result a large proportion will 
still have to be carried by steamship at existing rates. To 
eliminate this and to ensure that those areas of Newfound-
land which are serviced entirely by steamship will receive 
the benefit of reduced freight rates in the same proportion 
as the areas accessible to the railway, it will be necessary 
either to subsidize our steamship service or to endeavour to 
have the Maritime Freight Rates Act so extended as to 
make it applicable to the Steamship Services.30
In reply, he was told that the delegation “had already noted this point 
for further consideration.” In its brief to the delegation, the St. John’s 
Board of Trade likewise called for the extrapolation of the subsidy of 
the Maritime Freight Rates Act to the Newfoundland Railway’s 
coastal services, a course of action for which there was no Canadian 
precedent.31
The preliminary work of the delegation in St. John’s led to the 
drafting of a lengthy memorandum that the Newfoundland negotiators 
took with them for submission in Ottawa.32 Section IX of this document 
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detailed the thinking of the delegation on the Newfoundland Railway 
and rejected the proposal of Canadian National Railways — made in a 
report included in the Black Books — that its projected Newfoundland 
operations should report to head office in Montreal through established 
regional headquarters in Moncton, New Brunswick. Because of its “in-
sular position” and “geographical and climatic conditions,” there should 
be a separate “Newfoundland Region” within the Canadian National 
system, with a regional manager in St. John’s who would report directly 
to Montreal. Echoing the argument of the St. John’s Board of Trade, 
section IX likewise called for the advantages of the Maritime Freight 
Rates Act to be extended “so as to include transfers to coastal steamers 
at terminals for delivery to all ports along the coast.” In section XXI of 
its memorandum, the delegation proposed a change in what was on 
offer regarding the ferry service across Cabot Strait. This involved revis-
ing the words “Canada will maintain in accordance with the traffic of-
fering a Steamship Service between North Sydney and Port-aux-
Basques” in clause 16(1) of the Grey Book to read “Canada will maintain 
in accordance with the traffic offering an efficient freight and passenger 
steamship service between North Sydney and Port-aux-Basques.” This 
change, it was argued, was justified by the increased volume of business 
that Confederation would bring and the resultant increase in traffic 
between the two ports. 
Ottawa prepared for the final talks as before: that is to say, through 
the mechanism of a cabinet committee on Newfoundland, which was 
advised by an interdepartmental committee, the latter chaired for this 
round by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs with 
MacKay as vice-chairman.33 The interdepartmental committee ap-
pointed subcommittees and one of them, chaired by Deputy Minister 
of Transport J.C. Lessard, had as its mandate transportation and com-
munications.34 The formal opening of talks between the Newfound-
land and Canadian delegations took place in the Senate Chamber, 
Ottawa, on 6 October 1948, with St. Laurent and Walsh acting as 
co-chairmen.35 Early on in the proceedings, the Newfoundlanders 
presented their memorandum as two parts, the first part dealing with 
106
Neary
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
financial matters and the second with everything else.36 As events 
unfolded, Canada rejected all three of the changes the Newfoundland 
side wanted vis-à-vis the railway and gulf ferry service. No provision 
was made for a separate Newfoundland region of Canadian National 
Railways, and the proposals to extrapolate subsidized rail freight rates 
to coastal services and change the wording regarding the North Sydney– 
Port aux Basques link were refused. According to Lessard, Newfound-
land would have all the protection it needed under section 312 of the 
Railway Act, 1919, which, of course, applied to the whole of Canada.37 
To the extent possible, it seemed Ottawa’s intention was that New-
foundland should fit within the existing federal framework.
Thus, when the final Terms of Union were signed in Ottawa on 11 
December 1948, the provisions relating to the Newfoundland Railway 
were reworded but not fundamentally changed from those in the offer 
sent to the National Convention in 1947.38 Clause 5 of that offer 
emerged as Term 31 in the final document, clause 16 as Term 32, and 
clause 8 as Term 33. In Term 31 the Newfoundland Railway remained 
at the head of the list of 13 services to be taken over by the govern-
ment of Canada and in Term 33 it remained first on the list of New-
foundland properties to become property of Canada (but with the 
reference to ships under construction in the United Kingdom dropped). 
In Term 32, section (1) remained as before but sections (2) and (3) 
were reworked with the reference to the Board of Transport Commis-
sioners dropped. The final text of Term 32, which became the subject 
of much litigation in later years, was as follows: 
32 (1) Canada will maintain in accordance with the traffic 
offering a freight and passenger steamship service between 
North Sydney and Port aux Basques, which, on comple-
tion of a motor highway between Corner Brook and Port 
aux Basques, will include suitable provision for the car-
riage of motor vehicles.
(2) For the purpose of railway rate regulation the Is-
land of Newfoundland will be included in the Maritime 
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region of Canada, and through-traffic moving between 
North Sydney and Port aux Basques will be treated as all-
rail traffic.
(3) All legislation of the Parliament of Canada provid-
ing for special rates on traffic moving within, into, or out of, 
the Maritime region will, as far as appropriate, be made 
applicable to the Island of Newfoundland.
On the same day that the Terms of Union were signed, the Government 
of Canada published Statements on questions raised by the Newfoundland 
delegation during the negotiations for the union of Newfoundland with 
Canada (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948). This 14-page collection covered 
matters that had come up in the negotiations but were “scarcely of a 
constitutional nature” and therefore not the stuff of “formal terms of 
union.” Item xiv dealt with the Newfoundland Railway and made this 
commitment: “After the date of Union, the Canadian National Rail-
ways will be entrusted with the responsibility of operating the New-
foundland Railway and Coastal Steamship Services, and it will be their 
responsibility to see that services are furnished commensurate with the 
traffic offering.” In February 1949, the Statute Law Amendment 
(Newfoundland) Act, which incorporated the changes to the Maritime 
Freight Rates Act, made necessary by Term 32, was passed by the 
Parliament of Canada.39 Finally, all required approval of the Terms of 
Union having been given, “immediately before the expiration of the 
thirty-first day of March, 1949” Newfoundland actually became a prov-
ince of Canada, the tenth in the country. 
The next day, the recently knighted Sir Albert Walsh, the first 
lieutenant-governor of the province of Newfoundland, swore in J.R. 
Smallwood as its first premier; the first provincial election was then 
held on 27 May. On 1 April also, by Order-in-Council, the Canadian 
government entrusted the management and operation of the New-
foundland Railway to Canadian National Railways “upon such terms 
and subject to such regulations and conditions” as it might “from 
time to time” decide upon.40 For its part, Canadian National, acting 
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within the Canadian regulatory framework, issued a rate schedule for 
Newfoundland — there was no general Maritime rate — that would be 
subject to the subsidy provided for in the Maritime Freight Rates Act.41
•  •  •
Seemingly, a smooth transition had been made in terms of railway ad-
ministration and service. But during the campaign leading to the May 
provincial election, Smallwood heard from Philip Gruchy, the manager 
of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company’s pulp and paper 
mill at Grand Falls and a signatory to the Terms of Union with Canada, 
that the freight rates Canadian National was charging in Newfound-
land “were in many cases higher, and in some cases considerably higher,” 
than those in effect in the Maritime provinces.42 In Gruchy’s view this 
constituted “a serious violation” of subsections 2 and 3 of Term 32. 
When Smallwood asked for details, he was shocked by what he heard 
back, but with Gruchy’s co-operation he was able to keep the matter 
quiet during the election campaign, thereby denying his opponents an 
opening to claim that the Canadian government was “beginning to 
violate the Terms of Union.”43 The premier promised Gruchy that he 
would deal with the matter as soon as possible after the election, which 
Smallwood’s Liberal Party won handily. Following the vote, the gov-
ernment engaged prominent St. John’s lawyer Philip J. (Phil) Lewis to 
handle the Newfoundland case, with a view to making representations 
in Ottawa. Thanks to his work on this assignment, Lewis quickly ac-
quired the reputation of being the province’s leading expert on the 
transportation arrangements made in the Terms of Union.44
After visiting Newfoundland 1–12 July 1949, Defence Minister 
Brooke Claxton reported to St. Laurent (prime minister since 15 No-
vember 1948) that while the people of the new province were more 
reconciled to union than he had thought possible, railway rates were a 
sore issue. The railway itself was “indescribable”:
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It seems to me quite out of the question to think of putting 
in a standard gauge. I think the best course to follow would 
be to straighten out some of the worst curves, reduce the 
grades and strengthen the bridges so as to take longer 
trains, the maximum loads now appearing to be eight or 
nine cars. The rails are in terrible condition, already short 
rails are flattened at both ends. It is almost impossible to 
read on the train. It takes 26 hours and 40 minutes of 
scheduled run from St. John’s to Port au[x] Basques over 
the whole length of lines. The people recognize that 
C.N.R. has been doing a good job since taking over the 
railways. For the first time most of the trains are beginning 
to run on schedule.
Yet, though rates were cheaper than before union, people felt “that 
they should have the same rates as those in effect in the Maritimes.”45 
There was “no such thing as a Maritime rate as a general class” and 
Newfoundland was now enjoying the benefit of the application of the 
Maritime Freight Rates Act to relevant charges. Nevertheless, there 
was a movement afoot for redress. 
Claxton’s expectation was that Newfoundland’s representations on 
the matter would receive “the most sympathetic consideration,” but in 
fact a rocky road lay ahead, as Newfoundland adjusted to the complex 
new reality of federal–provincial relations. In September 1949, Small-
wood. Lewis, and Attorney General Leslie R. Curtis went to Ottawa 
with representatives of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development 
Company, Buchans Mining Company, Bowater Pulp and Paper Mills 
Company (Corner Brook), and Associated Newfoundland Industries 
(St. John’s).46 Two briefs seeking redress were presented to Transport 
Minister Lionel Chevrier, one by the Newfoundland government and 
one by the business representatives present. For his part, Chevrier under-
took to take the matter up with his government colleagues.
While this matter was pending, the Royal Commission on Trans-
portation — the first such Canadian body to visit Newfoundland — 
held hearings in St. John’s from 27 to 29 September. Appointed on 29 
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December 1948, the Commission was Ottawa’s answer to the rising 
tide of complaint in Canada about higher freight rates in the post-war 
period. It was chaired by former Chief Justice of Saskatchewan W.F.A. 
Turgeon and had as its other members the distinguished academics 
Henry Forbes Angus (University of British Columbia) and Harold 
Adams Innis (University of Toronto), the author of The Cod Fisheries: 
The History of an International Economy, published in 1940. In welcom-
ing the commissioners to Newfoundland at the start of their hearings, 
Smallwood observed that “for purposes of railway rate regulation” the 
Terms of Union had put Newfoundland in the Maritime region and 
that the province was entitled to exactly what that region got, “no 
more and no less.”47 Barring a change in the relevant provision of the 
Terms of Union, he said in clear and unmistakeable language, “we 
stand or fall by what the maritime region generally may get.”
Following on from Smallwood’s remarks, the Newfoundland gov-
ernment’s brief to the Royal Commission was presented by Lewis and 
read aloud by businessman George McNamara, who had assisted in its 
preparation. In his introductory comments, Lewis reiterated what 
Smallwood had said regarding railways rates: “It is generally accepted 
. . . that the freight rate structure applicable to the maritime region is 
automatically effective in Newfoundland and that this province is en-
titled to freight rate privileges, no better and no worse than those 
obtaining in the maritime region.”48 The Newfoundland brief, he 
explained, dealt with matters of “general application” but did not deal 
with “the question of freight rates, as such.” This approach was “consis-
tent with the policy of government,” which was “based upon the 
principle” that the “application of freight rates” to the province was “a 
matter incidental to the interpretation of the terms of union” and 
therefore “a question for settlement between the central and the pro-
vincial governments.” Once the principle of equality as between New-
foundland and the Maritime provinces was accepted by the two levels 
of government, it would be up to the Board of Transport Commis-
sioners to formulate an actual schedule of rates. 
On 4 October, having heard from Chevrier that Ottawa wanted to 
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refer the freight rates issue to the Board of Transport Commissioners for 
decision, Smallwood followed the same line of argument in a letter to 
St. Laurent, intended to be “off the record” lest the matter “be flung to 
the Opposition.”49 While he was “clearly not a constitutional lawyer,” 
Smallwood ventured, the reference now suggested to the Board of 
Transport Commissioners struck him “as being altogether wrong”:
Surely, what we have here is a question of interpreting the 
B.N.A. Act, and unless I am on the wrong track the Board 
has no jurisdiction in such a matter. The Terms of Union 
were made by the Government of Canada and the Gov-
ernment of Newfoundland, and enacted by the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom. We, for our part, say that one of 
the Terms or clauses in this Act is being violated by the 
C.N.R. Through Mr. Chevrier we ask the Government of 
Canada if they agree that this violation has taken place. If 
the Government of Canada agree that the violation has 
occurred, then I suppose the next step is that they inform 
the C.N.R. and instruct them to effect rates in conformity 
with our mutual interpretation of the clause in question. If, 
on the other hand, the two Governments cannot agree on 
the meaning of the clause in question then, surely, the pro-
cedure is to refer it to somebody having jurisdiction in the 
matter of interpreting the B.N.A. Act. True, there is such 
a body as the Board of Transport Commissioners set up to 
deal with Railway matters as such, but suppose the alleged 
violation had occurred in a matter to deal with which no 
particular body had been set up. In that case how would 
the matter be resolved? 
I am only thinking aloud in this matter, but it does 
seems to me that it is a matter of interpreting the B.N.A. 
Act, and if the two Governments concerned are unable to 
agree on the interpretation then surely it becomes a matter 
for the Supreme Court of Canada, or possibly the Exche-
quer Court of Canada.
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With all the interests concerned pressing him “to know what is to 
happen in the matter,” Smallwood sought St. Laurent’s advice and 
asked for “an early reply.” “I am trying,” he cautioned, “to prevent this 
matter from becoming a political football.”
St. Laurent’s reply gave nothing and was in keeping with the in-
tention on the Canadian side in the negotiation of the Terms of Union 
that, to the extent possible, Newfoundland would fit within the exist-
ing framework of Canadian federalism. While the Board of Transport 
Commissioners was not mentioned in the Terms of Union, it had been 
specifically referred to in the offer sent to the National Convention in 
1947. In sum, the Newfoundland side had been left in no doubt about 
how railway freight issues were dealt with in Canada. Accordingly, St. 
Laurent told Smallwood that there was nothing he could add to the 
letter the premier had received from Chevrier: “We do not feel it 
would be appropriate for us, in so intricate a matter, to reach a decision 
as to what the proper freight rates should be. If, as you suggest, a point 
of law is involved, and the provincial authorities should not be satisfied 
by the decision of the Board of Transport Commissioners, they would, 
as Mr. Chevrier indicated, have the right of appeal by leave to the 
Supreme Court.”50 For the Canadian government to adopt any other 
course in the matter “would be tantamount to an attempt . . . to assume 
judicial functions” it did not possess. The way to ensure that the issue 
that had arisen did not become “a political football” was to have it 
“determined by the appropriate tribunals.” 
Smallwood got the message, and the province forthwith applied to 
the Board of Transport Commissioners for an order directing Cana-
dian National to cancel its existing Newfoundland tariff schedule and 
replace it with charges based on current Maritime rates. Newfound-
land was represented before the board by Attorney General Curtis and 
Phil Lewis and Canadian National by A.K. Dysart and A.H. Hart. 
Argument was heard in Ottawa on 14 December 1949, and on 14 
February 1950 the Board ruled on “all that the parties . . . wish to have 
at present,” namely, a decision as to whether Term 32(2) and (3) pre-
cluded Canadian National “from exercising in Newfoundland the right 
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which it would otherwise have under the Railway Act . . . to discriminate 
in rates because of dissimilarity in circumstances and conditions.”51 In 
the Board’s view it was “expedient to decide this preliminary question 
before proceeding further with the case.” Its answer to the immediate 
question before it was “No”; while Term 32(2) might mean that rates 
in Newfoundland had to be “in general conformity with the rate struc-
ture in the other Maritime Provinces,” it did not negate the principles 
on which it had previously acted “in regard to discrimination under the 
provisions of the Railway Act.” 
This was an unpromising start for Newfoundland but, following 
further hearings in St. John’s and Ottawa, the Board issued a second 
decision in the case on 22 January 1951.52 The Board now upheld the 
basic Newfoundland claim and rejected Canadian National’s conten-
tion that the Terms of Union did not “go beyond making applicable, in 
every relevant respect, the benefits of the Maritime Freight Rates Act.” 
Applying this narrow interpretation, the railway had “included a so-
called surcharge in support of which it contended that extra handling 
charges were involved in the transferring of traffic at Port aux Basques,” 
an action that was “strenuously opposed by the Province.” The finding 
of the Board was that “notwithstanding certain dissimilar, disadvanta-
geous circumstance and conditions pertaining to Newfoundland,” 
under Term 32 the province was “to be included rate-wise in the Mar-
itime region on a general level of rates similar to the other Maritime 
Provinces.” Moreover, “as a Special Act,” the Terms of Union took 
precedence over “any provisions of the Railway Act to the contrary.” 
Based on these conclusions, the Board directed Canadian National 
to come up with a revised rate schedule for Newfoundland to take 
effect on 1 March 1951. The first of three conditions specified for this 
was the “removal of the so-called surcharges.”53 Under this dispensa-
tion, Term 32(2) was “interpreted to require the extrapolation to points 
in Newfoundland on a mileage basis, of rates applicable from Central 
Canada to the Maritime Provinces.”54 Rates constructed accordingly 
were to be “maximum rates,” that is, “CN could not charge rates to 
Newfoundland higher than those constructed according to Term 
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32(2).”55 Newfoundland subsequently sought compensation for the 
amount Canadian National had overcharged shippers after 1 April 
1949, but this claim met a cool reception in Ottawa (though the fed-
eral government made a detailed response, those details are buried in 
a heavily redacted Department of Justice file — one of many — in the 
holdings of Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa).56
Following his success before the Board, Lewis ran as a Liberal 
candidate in the provincial general election held on 26 November 
1951. He was elected in the two-member riding of Harbour Main–
Bell Island and from 1951 to 1971 sat in the Smallwood cabinet as a 
minister without portfolio. In 1953, Smallwood raised with St. Lau-
rent the matter of compensation for the excess charges that Canadian 
National had imposed on Newfoundland shippers between 1949 and 
1951, but this claim did not succeed. In 1966, Lewis chaired a provin-
cial Royal Commission on Transportation. Its report described “the 
Newfoundland Freight Rates Case of 1951” as “the Magna Carta of 
Newfoundland insofar as its rail formula is concerned.”57 Accordingly, 
it was of “transcendent importance” to the province that the freight 
rate structure achieved through this case “be retained intact.”58
•  •  •
By this time, Newfoundland was witnessing the start of a transporta-
tion revolution, which in a few years would leave the railway age behind. 
In 1965, in one of its finest achievements, the Smallwood government 
completed the paving of the Trans-Canada Highway across New-
foundland from St. John’s to Port aux Basques, a development that had 
decidedly negative consequences for Canadian National’s rail operations 
in the province. Passenger service on the main line of the Newfound-
land railway ended in 1969 after the national carrier had introduced a 
trans-island bus service (CN Roadcruiser). In 1978 Canadian National 
spun off its east coast ferry operations to a subsidiary, CN Marine. The 
next year it assigned its Newfoundland land operations — rail, bus, 
and trucking — to another subsidiary, Terra Transport. Meanwhile, in 
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1977, with the shift from rail to road well advanced, Memorial Uni-
versity psychology professor Arthur M. Sullivan59 was named by 
Ottawa to lead a one-person Commission of Inquiry into Newfound-
land Transportation.60 In recommendation 29 of his 1978 report, he 
called for an immediate start on planning “to phase out the railway in 
Newfoundland in approximately ten years.”61 In actual fact the railway 
was abandoned exactly a decade later under the terms of a federal–
provincial agreement popularly known as “Roads for Rails.”62 In the 
memorandum of understanding between the two governments, Term 
32(2) was referenced in two sections:
3. The Minister of Transport for Canada undertakes, through 
CNR, to maintain, consistent with changing market con-
ditions, an active and ongoing freight presence in the 
Newfoundland market; and the Governor in Council, pur-
suant to Section 99 of the Financial Administration Act 
(Canada), has directed CNR to develop and apply, with 
such modifications as may be required to effect an orderly 
transition from rail to an inter-modal system, freight rates 
for its through inter-modal freight traffic to, from, and on 
the Island of Newfoundland that are based on the princi-
ples set out in Term 32 (2) of the Terms of Union with 
Newfoundland. Order in Council, P.C. 1988-1202 dated 
June 16, 1988.
9.  It is agreed that nothing herein shall prejudice the legal 
position either party may wish to take with respect to Term 
32 (2) of the Terms of Union at any time following the 
closure of the Newfoundland Railway, except with regard to 
providing and maintaining a railway in Newfoundland.63
Canadian National got to close down a burdensome rail line, 
while maintaining responsibility under Term 32(1) for the Gulf ferry 
service, and the province got an infusion of cash to improve transpor-
tation infrastructure. The deal was billed both in Ottawa and St. John’s 
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as win/win. Transportation of goods to Newfoundland via the North 
Sydney–Port aux Basques ferry would now be by container or boxcar, 
with railway rates applied to Newfoundland destinations now involv-
ing rail, water, and truck transportation. Moreover, in an increasingly 
competitive environment under the National Transportation Act, 
1987, railway rates in Canada were often buried in confidential con-
tracts. The 1987 Act updated the National Transportation Act of 1967, 
under which the Board of Transport Commissioners had been re-
placed by the Canadian Transport Commission.64 Under the 1987 
Act, a successor body, the National Transportation Agency (NTA), 
was launched.
On 6 July 1989, the meaning of Term 32 in the new transporta-
tion and regulatory environments was tested when Atlantic Container 
Express Inc. (ACE), a Montreal-based ocean shipping company with 
container service to St. John’s and a competitor of Canadian National 
— the two had a history of regulatory battle — filed a complaint with 
the fledgling NTA.65 In 1982 ACE had complained to the Minister of 
Transport that some Canadian National freight rates to Newfound-
land were non-compensatory (i.e., constituted unfair competition).66 
The complaint had led to an investigation by the Railway Transport 
Committee of the Canadian Transport Commission and four interim 
orders in favour of the complainant.67 The last of these, issued after 
public hearings had been held in Montreal and St. John’s in October 
1984, had triggered a petition to the federal cabinet by Canadian 
National and the issuance of Privy Council Order No. 1985-575, 
dated 19 February 1985. This order had suspended the rate increases 
ordered by the regulator until such time as it had concluded “a full and 
comprehensive investigation . . . of all matters related to the compen-
satory rate issue on all traffic between mainland Canada and Newfound-
land.”68 Then, on 14 February 1986, having completed its investigation, 
the Railway Transport Committee had issued a further order (No. 
R-39045) reining in the railway.69 Newfoundland had immediately 
applied for review of this order, and on 28 August 1987 the regulator 
had issued a further ruling. This had set out a methodology to be 
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followed by Canadian National in constructing rates to ensure com-
pliance with the Terms of Union, which took precedence over the stat-
utory requirements of the Railway Act. 
ACE’s 1989 complaint, however, maintained that Canadian Na-
tional was still offside and was “charging rates to Newfoundland desti-
nations not consistent with the requirements of the Terms of Union.”70 
Specifically, the company complained about rates being charged by 
Canadian National “on pool car traffic from Toronto and Montreal, . . . 
on insulation from Ottawa, and . . . on flour from Montreal.” These, it 
was maintained, were not compensatory and were “at less than the 
level required by the Terms of Union.”71 In response, the NTA, having 
issued a first decision in the matter on 3 October 1989, held public 
hearings in St. John’s (14 and 15 August 1990) and Corner Brook (20 
and 21 August 1990) to determine how Term 32(2) “should be applied 
in establishing rates for the transportation of goods to Newfoundland, 
within the new regulatory regime” created by the 1987 Act.72 In its 
decision, dated 22 May 1991, the agency agreed that “Terms of Union 
rates, based on Maritime rates . . . should be developed using rail mile-
ages through North Sydney to Port aux Basques and onto St. John’s, as 
if the Newfoundland Railway was still in place.” Canadian National 
was directed to act accordingly, while being authorized to “move freight 
to Newfoundland by any manner and any route.”73 On 19 June 1991 
Newfoundland applied to the Federal Court of Appeal for leave to 
appeal this decision. The province maintained that in its decision the 
NTA had erred in law in five matters and consequently had not given 
full effect to Term 32; “important constitutional issues” were at stake 
that affected “the public interest in respect of all shippers, receivers and 
residents of Newfoundland.” On 2 September 1992 the Court acceded 
to Newfoundland’s leave application but on 30 April 1996 the prov-
ince discontinued its appeal.74
Meanwhile, on 6 May 1992, the NTA — after receiving detailed 
information from Canadian National, issuing an interim report dated 13 
February, and hearing from all interested parties — had issued a further 
decision.75 This concluded that “the Terms of Union rate development 
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methodology” described in the 1991 decision would “continue to pro-
vide Newfoundland with a constitutionally mandated and competitive 
rate structure that integrates the mainland conditions”: “The intent of 
term 32(2) was to provide maximum rate protection to Newfoundland 
so that the province would not be disadvantaged by its distance from the 
mainland.” In a further ruling in the same case on 26 November 1992, 
the NTA made known that it would “determine all complaints on Terms 
of Union rates and corresponding compensatory costs” based on the 
methodology in its 22 May 1991 decision.76 In sum, in the wake of the 
Roads for Rails agreement and in a time of transformed transportation 
arrangements, the NTA held that Term 32(2) was alive, well, and work-
able, even in the absence of rail service across Newfoundland.
In February 1995, with the political climate favouring further de-
regulation, the subsidies provided under the Maritime Freight Rates 
Act were ended. In June of that year a bill for legislation to be known 
as the Canada Transportation Act was introduced into Parliament. It 
received royal assent on 29 May 1996 and under its terms the NTA 
became the Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA). In a prefatory 
declaration the Canada Transportation Act held up “competition and 
market forces . . . whenever possible” as the “prime agents in providing 
viable and effective transportation services.”77 A further test of Term 
32(2) followed when, in 1997, Gordon Moffatt, the owner of a com-
pany that moved containers between central Canada and Newfound-
land, asked the CTA for final offer arbitration in a dispute he had in 
progress with Canadian National over shipping rates applied to his 
traffic.78 Under the relevant section of its governing legislation, the 
CTA was required to refer the matter to an arbitrator chosen by the 
two parties or, failing that, an arbitrator of its own choosing. 
In this case, however, before referring the dispute to arbitration, 
the agency ruled on the applicability in existing circumstances of Term 
32(2). Counsel for Canadian National argued that “Term 32(2) had no 
further application after closure of the Newfoundland Railway in 
1988”; that there was “no longer any relevant railway rate regulation to 
which Term 32(2) could apply”; and that because the company was no 
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longer a Crown corporation — it had been privatized in 1995 — there 
was no law binding it “to implement Term 32(2) in its rate making 
with respect to movements to Newfoundland that include[d] rail 
transportation.”79 But the CTA, while acknowledging that the “iden-
tification of a Maritime rate structure” had become difficult with “the 
majority of railway traffic” now moving under “rules contained in con-
fidential contracts,” nevertheless ruled on 2 June 1999 that the Consti-
tution of Canada required “Terms of Union rates” (the British North 
America Act, 1949, which incorporated the Terms of Union, was in-
cluded in the schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982 and renamed the 
Newfoundland Act).80 In brief, the CTA ruled: 
that Term 32(2) continued to apply to Mr. Moffatt’s traffic 
and that CN had obligations under Term 32(2). While 
acknowledging that the development of a Maritime rate 
structure may be a difficult task for an arbitrator and that 
the arbitrator may not have expertise in rate matters, the 
Agency concluded that the arbitrator could use his own 
resources or ask for assistance from the Agency. It, there-
fore, submitted the matter for arbitration, assigning the 
task of developing a Maritime rate structure and Terms of 
Union rates to the arbitrator, reminding the arbitrator that 
the Terms of Union are mandatory and a paramount con-
sideration in the arbitration.81
Term 32(2) applied to rates even if in practice this meant a “best guess 
figure.”82
Canadian National appealed this outcome and in a decision dated 
31 October 2001, written by Justice Marshall E. Rothstein and con-
curred in by Chief Justice John D. Richard and Justice Marc Noël, the 
Federal Court of Appeal decided in favour of the railway company.83 
Term 32(2), Rothstein wrote, did not “of itself ” require rate regulation. 
While it was true that the opening words “For the purpose of rate 
regulation” presumed “the existence of rate regulation that is relevant 
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to the balance of the Term,” these words did “not mandate that Parlia-
ment enact or maintain such regulation.” For Term 32(2) to be operative 
there had to “exist some relevant railway rate regulation in legislation” 
administered by the CTA. In fact, in the existing “deregulated envi-
ronment,” no such regulation existed: “The notion of a Maritime rate 
structure had become an anachronism and there was no basis upon 
which to establish a realistic Maritime rate structure from which could 
be extrapolated rates to Newfoundland.” It was unreasonable “to con-
clude that the Constitution of Canada would require that regulation 
of freight rates would be based on ‘best guess’ figures.” And while it 
was true that the Constitution as “the supreme law of Canada” had to 
be “adapted to conditions that did not exist when its various provisions 
were enacted,” the “living tree doctrine” — Lord Sankey’s famous dic-
tum in the 1929 Persons Case (Edwards v. Canada [Attorney General]) 
— could not “be stretched to animate a provision that is a practical 
anachronism.” In the circumstances the application of Term 32(2) was 
“suspended,” pending the provision of “relevant rate regulation.” A 
constitutional Gordian knot had been surgically cut.
•  •  •
But what about rates on the “freight and passenger steamship service” 
Ottawa was constitutionally obligated by Term 32(1) to maintain be-
tween North Sydney and Port aux Basques “in accordance with the 
traffic offering”? And what was now meant by the commitment in 
Term 32(2) with respect to railway rate regulation to include “the 
Island of Newfoundland . . . in the Maritime region of Canada” and to 
treat “through-traffic moving between North Sydney and Port aux 
Basques” as “all-rail traffic.” In February 2016 this leftover business 
was tested in a case started by Oceanex, a short-sea shipping company 
formed in 1990 through the merger of ACE and Atlantic Searoute 
Partnership of Halifax. Oceanex operated between mainland Canadian 
ports and St. John’s and was the main competitor of Marine Atlantic 
Inc. (MAI), the subsidized Crown entity currently operating the ferry 
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service on the North Sydney–Port aux Basques route pursuant to 
Term 32(1).84 In an application to the Federal Court of Canada, 
Oceanex requested judicial review of commercial freight rates ap-
proved by the Minister of Transport for the Gulf service effective 1 
April 2016.85 In approving these rates, Oceanex maintained, the min-
ister had violated the National Transportation Policy (NTP) specified 
in the 1996 Canada Transportation Act. The approved rates had “an 
injurious effect” on the company and unduly reduced “its inherent ad-
vantages as a water transportation provider, contrary to the terms of 
the National Transportation Policy.” Oceanex asked that the Court 
quash the approved rates and order the minister to “approve MAI 
commercial freight rates that are sufficient to fully recover its costs or, 
in the alternative, such level of subsidized rates as is necessary to main-
tain freight service between North Sydney and Port aux Basques in 
accordance with the Terms of Union, and is not injurious to Oceanex 
in accordance with . . . the National Transportation Policy.”
The case was heard by Justice Cecily Y. Strickland, who ruled 
against the company on 7 March 2018.86 “I am not persuaded,” she 
wrote in passing, “that the NTP can serve to constrain the level of pub-
lic costs assumed by Canada in meeting its constitutional obligation to 
provide for ferry services on the Constitutional Route as imposed by 
the Terms of Union.” In sum, when it came to subsidy for MAI’s Gulf 
ferry service between North Sydney and Port aux Basques, Term 32 
trumped legislative requirement. As the Terms of Union were “clear” 
about the matter in dispute, Justice Strickland reasoned, it was not nec-
essary “to resort to historical evidence” to decide the case. At the time 
of writing, her decision was before the Federal Court of Appeal. 
•  •  •
In his useful March 2003 paper “The Terms of Union: An Analysis of 
Their Current Relevance,” which he prepared for the Newfoundland 
and Labrador government’s Royal Commission on Renewing and 
Strengthening Our Place in Canada, the St. John’s lawyer and legal 
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scholar Stephen May, QC, sensibly concluded that, overall, “the force 
and effect” of the Terms of Union had essentially been “spent.”87 The 
much-litigated Term 32 is an exception. Under Term 32(1), Ottawa 
has a continuing obligation to maintain the Gulf ferry service on what 
Justice Strickland termed the “Constitutional Route.” Moreover, pur-
suant to Justice Rothstein’s searching decision in the Moffatt case, 
Newfoundland and Labrador has a continuing right to any relevant 
rate advantage that Ottawa might extend to the Maritime provinces, 
the force of Term 32(2) being “suspended” rather than “spent,” though 
in practice this may be a distinction without a difference. Constitu-
tionally, except as provided for in the Terms of Union, now mainly 
overtaken by the passage of time, Newfoundland and Labrador is a 
province comme les autres. This is what was intended in 1948 and has 
been acknowledged in the courts.
On 11 February 1985 the government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador and the government of Canada signed a memorandum of 
agreement “on joint management of the offshore oil and gas resourc-
es off Newfoundland and Labrador and the sharing of revenue from 
the exploitation of these resources.”88 Known as the Atlantic Accord, 
this memorandum was arguably the most important document nego-
tiated between Ottawa and St. John’s since the 1948 Terms of Union. 
Under section 64, Ottawa agreed that, “should the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador achieve the requisite support among 
the other provinces for the constitutional entrenchment of the Ac-
cord . . . it would introduce a mutually agreeable resolution into 
Parliament.” No such resolution has ever been introduced, and secur-
ing the “requisite support” would obviously be a formidable chal-
lenge in a country as regionally conflicted as Canada. Except under 
section 43 of the amendment procedure in the Constitution Act, 
1982, which covers amendment “to any provision that applies to one 
or more, but not all provinces,” it is hard to get something new into 
the Canadian Constitution.89 This is all the more reason to appreci-
ate and understand what is already in that document. In the case of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, it would always be instructive to start 
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with the constitutionally entrenched Terms of Union, especially the 
tangled history of Term 32.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful for research assistance to Dr. Melvin Baker of St. John’s, 
Newfoundland and Labrador; and John Sadler, director of the John & 
Dotsa Bitove Family Law Library at the University of Western On-
tario, London, Ontario. I thank Jock Bates of Victoria, British Colum-
bia, for editorial advice, and the Honourable Marshall E. Rothstein of 
Vancouver for reading my first draft. I learn much about the law from 
Professor Robert E. Hawkins of the Johnson Shoyama Graduate 
School of Public Policy, University of Regina, Regina, Saskatchewan. 
Notes
1 Jeffrey F. Collins, “Executive Federalism and the Terms of Union: A 
New Approach to Understanding the ‘Roads-for-Rails’ and ‘Roads-
for-Boats’ Agreements,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 27, no. 2 
(Fall 2012): 157–78.
2 For a general account of the history of Newfoundland in the immedi-
ate post-Second World War period, see my Newfoundland in the North 
Atlantic World, 1929–1949 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1988).
3 Acts of the Commission of Government, 1946, 115.
4 This account of the railway draws on information in Library and 
Archives Canada (LAC), RG12 (Records of the Department of Trans-
port), vol. 2595, file 104-5-1 (part 1), “Newfoundland Railway and 
Steamship Services”; and Meeting between delegates for the National 
Convention of Newfoundland and representatives of the Government of 
Canada[:] Ottawa, June25th–September 29th, 1947 (hereafter Meeting 
between delegates . . . 1947), Part I (Summary of Proceedings), Appendix 
II, “Memorandum presented by the Newfoundland delegation at the 
commencement of the discussions, outlining services which, in the 
event of union, would appear to fall in the federal sphere.” 
124
Neary
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
5 For details of this, see Malcolm MacLeod, “Subsidized Steamers to a 
Foreign Country: Canada and Newfoundland, 1892-1949,” Acadiensis 
14, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 66–92.
6 Meeting between delegates . . . 1947, Part I (Summary of Proceedings), 
Appendix II, 19.
7 See James K. Hiller and Michael Harrington, eds., The Newfoundland 
National Convention 1946–1948 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill- 
Queen’s University Press, 1995), vol. 2, Reports and Papers, “Report of 
the Transportation and Communications Committee,” 75–153. For 
the section on the railway, see 103–18.
8 Paul Bridle, ed., Documents on Relations between Canada and New-




11 Ibid., 171–72. 
12 Ibid., 245–48.
13 The archival reference is MG30, E159.




18 LAC, MG30, E159 (R.A. MacKay fonds), vol. 5, file “Draft Commit-
tee Meetings, Rough Drafts of Proposals, 1947.” 
19 Ibid.
20 Bridle, ed., Documents, vol. 2, part 1, 648.
21 Ibid., 649–51.
22 For these events, see Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 
309–10.
23 Proposed Arrangements for the Entry of Newfoundland into Confederation[:] 
Terms believed to constitute a fair and equitable basis for union of Newfound-
land with Canada should the people of Newfoundland desire to enter into 
confederation[,] October 29,1947 (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1948), 3.
24 See T. Stephen Henderson, “A Defensive Alliance: The Maritime 
Provinces and the Turgeon Commission on Transportation, 1948–
1951,” Acadiensis 35, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 46–64 (https://journals.lib.
125
The Newfoundland Railway, Freight Rates, and the Terms of Union
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
unb.ca/index.php/acadiensis/article/view/10598/11213).
25 Bridle, Documents, vol. 2, part 1, 723.
26 Ibid., 793–99.
27 Acts of the Commission of Government, 1948, 49.
28 Under Commission of Government, three of the commissioners were 
drawn from the United Kingdom and three from Newfoundland. 
Walsh had been appointed a commissioner on 5 September 1944.
29 The minutes of the meetings are in The Rooms Provincial Archives 
(RPA), St. John’s, GN154 (Newfoundland Delegation to Ottawa, 
1948), box, 1.
30 Bridle, ed., Documents, vol. 2, part 2, 1030.
31 A copy of the brief is in RPA, Albert J. Walsh Papers, MG302.23.
32 For a transcription of this document, see Melvin Baker and Peter 
Neary, “Negotiating Final Terms of Union with Canada: The Memo-
randum Submitted by the Newfoundland Delegation, Ottawa, 13 
October 1948,” Newfoundland and Labrador Studies 38, no. 2 (2018): 
459–506. An original copy of the memorandum is in RPA, Albert J. 
Walsh Papers, MG302.40.
33 The first meeting, with MacKay in the chair, was held on 19 August. 
For the minutes, see LAC, RG 12 (Department of Transport), vol. 
2595, file 104-5-1 (part 3).
34 Bridle, Documents, vol. 2, part 2, 1106.
35 Ibid., 1117.
36 For the financial part of the delegation’s memorandum, see ibid., 
1127–30.
37 LAC, RG 12, vol. 2595, file 104-5-1, part 5, Newfoundland Negotia-
tions Minister’s Copy.
38 For the final Terms of Union, see British North America Act, 1949 
(since 1982 the Newfoundland Act) in United Kingdom, Public 
General Statutes, 1949, vol. 1, chap. 22, 52–57. 
39 Statutes of Canada, 1949, vol. 1, chap. 6, 37–58.
40 PC 1454. I am grateful to Peter O’Flaherty, QC, for a copy of the 
order.
41 For the evolution of freight rates in post-Confederation Newfound-
land, see LAC, RG13 (Department of Justice), vol. 2989, file 
9-166726, “Statement Showing First Class Freight Rates in Cents per 
126
Neary
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
100 lbs. from Toronto, Ont. and Montreal, Que. to North Sydney, N.S. 
and Representative Destinations in Newfoundland” and RG30-A-1-C 
(Canadian National Railways), vol. 13217, file 9717-5, 1949–1957, 
“Newfoundland Freight Rates,” memorandum enclosed in Asst. 
General Freight Traffic Manager to Vaughan, 8 May 1957.
42 Memorial University Libraries, Archives and Special Collections 
(ASC), COLL-075 ( J.R. Smallwood Papers), file 3.10.013, Small-
wood to St. Laurent, 4 Oct. 1949.
43 Ibid.
44 Having gone to sea as a young man, Lewis prided himself on being 
the only lawyer practising in St. John’s to also have a first mate’s 
certificate. His dual qualification made him Newfoundland’s leading 
maritime lawyer. I am grateful to John Lewis for biographical 
information about his father. 
45 LAC, MG 32-B5 (Brooke Claxton fonds), vol. 117, file “Newfound-
land: Miscellaneous 1948–1949,” Memorandum to the Prime 
Minister, 21 July 1949.
46 LAC, RG30-A-1-C, vol. 13217, file 9717-5, 1949–1957, C.L. McCoy 
(General Freight Agent), Memorandum of Conference held in office 
of Minister of Transport, 19 Sept. 1949; ASC, COLL-075, file 
3.10.013, Smallwood to St. Laurent, 4 Oct. 1949.
47 LAC, RG 33 (Royal Commissions), Royal Commission on Transpor-
tation, 27 Sept. 1949, vol. 32, 6144.
48 Ibid., 6148.
49 ASC, COLL-075, Smallwood to St. Laurent, 4 Oct. 1949. 
50 ASC, COLL-075, St. Laurent to Smallwood, 12 Oct. 1949.
51 K.D.M. Spence, ed., Canadian Railway and Transport Cases (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book Co., 1950), vol. 64, 352–53.
52 K.D.M. Spence, ed., Canadian Railway and Transport Cases (Toronto; 
Canada Law Book Co., 1954), vol. 67, 353–59. 
53 Ibid., 358.
54 Federal Court of Appeal, Canadian National Railway Co. v. Moffatt, 
31 Oct. 2001 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fca/doc/2001/2001f-
ca327/2001fca327.html).
55 Ibid.
56 LAC, RG13, vol. 2989, file 9-166726, Newfoundland Terms of Union 
127
The Newfoundland Railway, Freight Rates, and the Terms of Union
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
S32 and S33. See also LAC, RG30-A-1-C, vol. 13217, file 9717-5, 
1949–1957, General Solicitor to Gordon, 29 May 1952. The New-
foundland claim was backed up by an Act of the provincial legislature 
that vested all relevant individual claims in “Her Majesty in right of 
Newfoundland” (Statutes of Newfoundland, 1952, No. 76, Freight 
Claims (Vesting in Crown) Act, 297–98). I have launched a complaint 
under the Access to Information Act to have LAC, RG13, vol. 2989, 
file 9-166726, Newfoundland Terms of Union S32 and S33, opened to 
researchers. 
57 Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission on Transportation, Sept. 
1966, 20.
58 Ibid.
59 Son-in-law of Phil Lewis.
60 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Newfoundland Transporta-
tion, vol. 1, July 1978 (http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collec-
tion_2016/bcp-pco/T22-37-1978-1-1-eng.pdf ); vol. 2, Feb. 1979 
(http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bcp-pco/
T22-37-1978-2-1-eng.pdf ); Executive Summary, July 1978.
61 Executive Summary, July 1978, “List of Recommendations Contained 
in Report,” viii.
62 See Toward 2000: A Newfoundland and Labrador Transportation 
Initiative, a copy of which is in the holdings of the Centre for 
Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University Libraries, St. John’s.
63 “Memorandum of Understanding on the Newfoundland Transporta-
tion Initiatives,” 20 June 1988 (copy courtesy Clerk of the Executive 
Council, Province of Newfoundland and Labrador). 
64 It had “separate committees to handle the five modes of transporta-
tion: rail, air, water, motor vehicle and commodity pipeline (except oil 
products)” (https://www.otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/publication/at-heart-trans-
portation-a-moving-history).
65 ACE was owned “jointly owned by Newfoundland Capital Corp. of 
Gander, the Harvey Group of St. John’s and CSL Group Inc. of 
Montreal” (Globe and Mail, 19 Nov. 1984, IB9).
66 My account of this complaint and its aftermath is based on informa-
tion in Canadian Transport Commission, Reports, 1987, Newfound-
land (Attorney General) and Atlantic Container Express, Inc. (Re) 
128
Neary
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
[1987] C.T.C.R., 23–68.
67 The orders were numbers R-35150, 6 May 1983; R-35460, 3 Aug. 
1983; R-37286, 10 Oct. 1984; and R-37611, 21 Dec. 1984 (LAC, 
RG2 [Privy Council Office], A1a, vol. 6063, PC 1985-575). See also 
Globe and Mail, 7 Jan. 1985, B16.
68 LAC, RG2, A1a, vol. 6063.
69 The order followed a decision dated 12 Feb. 1986.
70 National Transportation Commission, Decision No. 509-R-1989 
(https://otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/ruling/509-r-1989).




74 The information given here is based on documents in the registry of 
the Federal Court of Appeal (91-A-2287), provided courtesy of Peter 
O’Flaherty, QC, and Jack O’Flaherty.
75 Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 254-R-1992 (https://
www.otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/ruling/254-r-1992?wbdisable=true).
76 Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 705-R-1992 (https://
www.otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/ruling/705-r-1992).
77 Statutes of Canada, 1996, C.10, section 5.
78 Canadian Transportation Agency, Decision No. 300-R-1999 (https://
otc-cta.gc.ca/eng/ruling/300-r-1999).
79 Federal Court of Appeal, Canadian National Railway Co. v. Moffatt, 






84 In its 1980 report on Newfoundland, the Economic Council of 
Canada had noted that transportation subsidies, “by underwriting the 
cost of goods imported from the mainland” to Newfoundland, had 
“hindered the growth of import-competing industries.” The Council 
had recommended “that the federal and provincial governments 
immediately enter into negotiations to establish a federal financial 
129
The Newfoundland Railway, Freight Rates, and the Terms of Union
newfoundland and labrador studies, 34, 1 (2019)
1719-1726
obligation to the Newfoundland government in place of the existing 
Gulf subsidy. They should also arrange to finance the adjustment of 
any workers directly affected by this action” (Economic Council of 
Canada, Newfoundland: From Dependency to Self-Reliance [Ottawa, 
1980], 23).
85 Federal Court of Canada, Notice of Application, 26 Feb. 2016, file 
T-348-16. 
86 Federal Court of Canada, Oceanex Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Trans-
port), 7 Mar. 2018 (https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/doc/2018/2018f-
c250/2018fc250.html). I served as an expert witness in this case, and 
the present paper draws on my affidavit.
87 See https://www.gov.nl.ca/publicat/royalcomm/research/May.pdf, 172.
88 See https://www.servicenl.gov.nl.ca/printer/publications/aa_mou.pdf.
89 For the complexity of constitutional amendment in Canada and its 
consequences, see R.E. Hawkins, “Constitutional Workarounds: 
Senate Reform and Other Examples,” Canadian Bar Review 89, no. 3 
(2011): 513–43. The amendments made to the Terms of Union in 
1997, 1998, and 2001 were in accordance with section 43.
